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Alfred Dunhill of
London v. Republic of Cuba:
International Law Redivivus
In Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba' the Supreme Court once
again considered the scope of the act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine,
a rule of federal law, provides that federal or state courts cannot consider the
validity, under international law, of acts of foreign governments which occur
within their own territory.' In Dunhill, the Court had to consider for the first
time whether the commercial acts of foreign governments must be considered
acts of state which cannot be challenged in United States courts.3
In order to understand the importance of the issue in Dunhill, it is necessary
to examine the case within the context of a series of decisions which have con-
cerned the act of state doctrine. The Supreme Court held, in 1963, that the
application of the act of state doctrine was required in order to prevent the
judiciary from impeding the executive's conduct of foreign relations, 4 and in
order to prevent the courts of this country from applying nationally biased
principles of international law which might diminish respect for international
law and authority.5 The trend of decisions since the Court's holding in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino has, however, been toward allowing courts to
apply international law to foreign government acts; and this trend suggests a
rejection of the Sabbatino rationale. 6 The Court's decision in Dunhill presented
an opportunity to take the final step in overruling its landmark holding in Sab-
batino. But, as will be seen, the Court never reached that question.
The specific issue in Dunhill, whether commercial acts are acts of state, is
of paramount concern to private commercial interests in the United States.
*A.B., University of California, Berkeley; J.D. candidate 1977, Yale Law School.
'Menendez v. Saks and Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom., Alfred Dunhill
of London v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974) restored to calendar for reargument with
additional question, 422 U.S. 1005 (1975).
'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-28 (1963); First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1971).
3See text, infra, at notes 87-105, hereinafter referred to as TAN.
'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-33 (1963); see TAN 14-17 infra.
'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 434-35, 437; see TAN 30-32 infra.
'Ibid., 85-86 infra.
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The Court's decision in Dunhill made possible a determination whether or
not private parties will henceforth be able to effectively bring suit against
foreign governments' commercial interests in federal court. 7 The Solicitor
General of the United States filed a brief in this case recommending that the
Court adopt a distinction between acts of state "qua sovereign" and govern-
ment acts taken in a commercial capacity. 8
I. The Act of State Doctrine and the Limitation
Of the Role of the Judiciary in the United States
A. The Act of State Doctrine as a General
Rule of Deference
The act of state doctrine 9 is in essence a rule of international comity 10 by
which the federal judiciary gives recognition to the authority of governments
in other states to make and enforce decisions." In doing so, federal courts
help preserve the present status of the international system, a system charac-
terized by the lack of strong centralized authority, and thereby facilitate trans-
national interaction. 12
The debate concerning the appropriate scope of the act of state doctrine
focuses on whether, and what, exception(s) should be permitted to this general
rule. Exceptions would allow federal courts to consider whether foreign gov-
ernment acts violate principles of international law. 3 If exceptions to the
general rule are permitted, federal courts could find foreign governmental acts
which violate international law to be invalid insofar as they affect the legal
rights of persons or property which are within federal jurisdiction.
B. Establishing a Priority of Interests
1. THE INTEREST WHICH FAVORS JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
The Supreme Court has feared that allowing adjudication of the legality of
foreign government acts might interfere with the executive's conduct of foreign
'Ibid., 110-16, infra.
'Brief for the United States as amicus curiae, Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba,
restored for reargument, 422 U.S. 1005 (1975).
9See TAN 2 supra.
"First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972).
"The act of state doctrine, according to Lauterpacht, is recognized as "(a) ... consequence of
equality-or independence-of States .... 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 267, § ll5aa (8th ed. 1955).
"See McDougal, Act of State in Policy Perspective: The International Law of an International
Economy, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATIONS SYMPOSIUM PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD,
STRUCTURES AND SAFEGUARDS, 327, 338-39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as McDougal, Act of State in
Policy Perspective].
"See generally, R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAw IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 403-22 (1970);
Friedmann, National Courts and the International Legal Order: Projections on the Implications of
the Sabbatino Case, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1966); McDougal, Act of State in Policy Per-
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relations. ' Its concern has been that foreign governments might take offense
at United States courts declaring their acts to be in violation of international
law. Since international law principles often lack "codification or consensus"
among nations, the Court's concern has been that the application of such prin-
ciples might be considered expressions of national interest rather than the
application of sound, disinterested principles of law.'" Essentially, the Court
equated the application of international law with the conduct of foreign policy 6
and has decided that in many cases the executive is best suited to resolve com-
peting claims. I7
There is a national interest in preventing adjudications from harming the
conduct of foreign affairs. The Constitution commits the conduct of foreign
relations to the political branches and there may be cases in which an adjudica-
tion might interfere with the conduct of delicate foreign policy negotiations."I
The Supreme Court, in its capacity as interpreter of the Constitution, may
determine that in certain cases the foreign policy interests of the United States
are best served by permitting the executive branch to resolve competing claims
involving foreign government acts. '9 If, in fact, a decision by a federal court that
an act of a foreign government violated international law might harm the
national interest or potentially lead to a breakdown in the international system,
this interest should be weighed by the Court when deciding whether or not to
limit the scope of the act of state doctrine.
2. THE INTERESTS OPPOSING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
The primary interest which should motivate the Court to permit the examina-
tion of foreign governmental acts under international law is the interest of this
country in promoting law or expectations which contribute to the maintenance
of a secure world economy. 2 0 In order to appreciate the way in which the appli-
cation of international law by the federal judiciary may further the interest of
United States citizens in the maintenance of a secure world economy it is neces-
sary to inquire briefly into the way in which international law is made.
spective, supra note 10; Goldie, The Sabbatino Case: International Law Versus the Act of State, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 107 (1964).
"4Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba 406 U.S. at 765-67; Snyder, BancoNacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino: The Supreme
Court Speaks, 16 SYACUSE L. REV. 15, 22-25 (1964).
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-33.
"aFirst National City Bank v. Bando Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972).
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
"See R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 433-36; Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino 376 U.S. at 461-71 (Justice White dissenting).
"See generally, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 210-16 (1972).
"The Supreme Court's decisions relating to the act of state doctrine have all involved competing
claims to property or other commercial interests. It is therefore appropriate to discuss the act of
state doctrine in the context of the maintenance of the international economy. Other classes of
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a. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS2 1
To view international law as a body of rules which are established through
the efforts of international organizations, other international authorities (such
as international courts) and treaties is to neglect the major role which national
decision-makers play in the creation of international law in a variety of other
situations. International law is in great part the expectations of national
officials about the way officials in other states will behave. 2 These expectations
are created in a process of continuous interaction between decision-makers
in various states.23 The expectations so created influence the way in which
authority is exercised. 24
When officials within a state decide to act in a certain way, their decision
is a claim to exercise authority which officials in other states evaluate. If the
claim in question is compatible with the interests of the external state(s), this
claim will most likely be tolerated (not challenged). If the claim is antithetical
to the interests of the external state(s), the claim will most likely be rejected
by one or more of a variety of means, such as diplomatic protest, economic
sanction, military action, etc. In accepting or rejecting claims, national offi-
cials (along with international officials) create expectations regarding the way
in which their authority will be exercised in the future.25
National courts, just as executive authorities such as presidents, prime minis-
ters and foreign offices, participate in the process by which expectations are
created. 6 When a national court decides to apply a certain rule of international
law in a particular case it is asserting a claim (by accepting or rejecting the
claim of a foreign state). This claim is evaluated by decision-makers in other
foreign government acts, such as acts which affect human rights, have not yet received judicial
attention in our courts. For this reason, acts other than those affecting the international economy
are not specifically treated in this note.
2 The model which is used in this section to describe the process by which international law is
made is a somewhat simplified version of the international law-making process model developed by
Professor Myres McDougal and his associates. For a more detailed description of the law-making
process, see generally, McDougal and Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955); and Suzuki, The New Haven School of Internation-
al Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 1 (1974).
"See McDougal and Schlei, id. at 655-57.
3Loc. Cit.
"Ibid., at 657.
"The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case [1951] I.C.J. 116, in which Britain objected to Norway's
use of unconventional baselines to define its territorial sea, and in which the International Court of
Justice upheld Norway's claim on the grounds of its "practical needs and . . . requirements,"
illustrates the process by which international law is created and applied. Id. at 665.
2 This is an example of the dedoublement fonctionnel first recognized by the late Professor
George Scelle. And see R. FALK, op. cit., 433.
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states and is taken into account when they decide whether to act in a certain
manner. 27
The act of state doctrine, when viewed within this process, serves to limit
the role of the federal judiciary in the process by which international law is
created and maintained. When the Supreme Court refuses to consider whether
the acts of a foreign government violate international law, it refuses to assert
a claim on behalf of this country.2 8 By applying principles of international law in
cases before it, the Court can contribute to the creation of or adherence to
principles of law which reflect this country's interest in maintaining a secure
international economy.2 9
The Supreme Court has held, in agreement with commentators such as
Professor Richard Falk, 30 that the application of challenged principles of inter-
national law by the courts of this country to acts of foreign governments whose
ideologies may differ from our own will diminish respect for international law
and authority.3" The suggestion has been made that rules of deference encour-
age the development of international law principles which are characterized
by "codification or consensus."32
In suggesting that international authorities33 and consensus34 play the major
role in the development of substantive international law principles the Court
attempts to promote a world order in which confrontation is minimized. While
the promotion of such a world order is obviously not to be discouraged,3" a
rapid strenghtening of international authority cannot soon be expected as a
means of protecting the right of nations and individuals to the maintenance
of a secure world economy. As Professor Falk concedes, nation-states remain
the primary repository of decision-making authority and will most likely con-
tinue in this status for the indefinite future.36 The interaction of national offi-
"Thus, if officials in another state know that federal courts in this country will examine an
expropriation under international law, they must take this situation into account when deciding
whether or not to expropriate in a manner which will be considered illegal by United States courts.
2 This does not mean that the Court asserts a claim only when it finds a foreign government act
to violate international law. If it decides that the act in question is compatible with international law
it likewise represents this country's interests in the process by which expectations are created.
"See McDougal, Act of State in Policy Perspective, 352.
3 The influence of Professor Falk's work on act of state related decisions has been explicitly
recognized by the Court. See, e.g., 376 U.S. at 424 n.22; 406 U.S. 759, 789 n.12, 790, 791 n.14,
793. Commentators have noted this impact as well. See, e.g., Professor Lillich's forward to R.
FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER at vii; cf.
Friedmann, supra note 13, 452-53.
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 434-35, 437; First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. at 793 (dissenting opinion).
32 R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DoMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, 6-7.
"E.g., id. at 14-15, 74-5, 171-72.
"E.g., id. at 8, 12, 15, 171.
"See McDougal, Act of State in Policy Perspective, supra note 12, at 351.
36R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, 16-19,
170-71.
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cials will continue to play a major role in the creation of international law, along
with the consensus resolutions of international organizations.3 7 The Supreme
Court, as both a national and international decision-maker, must consider
that when it declines to limit the scope of the act of state doctrine, refusing
to apply international law in a case before it, it is refusing to assert a claim on
behalf of this country's interest in the maintenance of a secure world economy.
b. THE INTEREST OF PRIVATE PARTIES
IN ADJUDICATION
The Constitution allocates to the judiciary the authority to decide cases before
it on their merits, including those in which international law must be applied
and in which foreign states are parties.3 8 In Choosing not to examine foreign
acts of state on their merits, i.e., not limit the scope of the act of state doctrine,
the Court forecloses the opportunity of private parties to obtain relief other than
by petition to the executive branch; it leaves in the hands of that branch the
authority to determine which interests must be given precedence in resolving
competing claims, and, again limits the capacity of private parties to obtain
relief on the legal merits of their claims. As a result, private interests are liable
to become subordinated to public interests, i.e. the interest in maintaining
friendly diplomatic relations.39 While there may be situations in which this
subordination of interests is necessitated by an overriding concern with main-
taining international order, the national interest is certainly not jeopardized by
every adjudication involving a foreign government's act.
The Supreme Court has suggested in prior determinations, that United States
citizens are advantaged in having their claims against foreign governments
championed by the executive as compared with bringing their claims into
court. 40 The Court decided that the positive effect which judicial determina-
tions may have on resolving claims in favor of wronged United States citizens
is minimal when compared with the success which may be achieved with the
variety of options open to the executive for obtaining redress.41 There is, how-
ever, scant justification for limiting the role of the judiciary in applying inter-
national law or for limiting the means open to private interests to obtain satis-
faction in saying that other remedies are available; "as if," it has been re-
marked, "one prohibited the other." 2
"See TAN 21-27 supra.
3 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 450-53 (Justice White dissenting).
31R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 429-30.
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 431, 435; First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. at 786-87 (dissenting opinion).
4'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 435; First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. at 786-87 (dissenting opinion).
'R. FALK, op. cit., 429.
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C. Three Preferred Criteria for Evaluating
Act of State Claims
In deciding whether to apply principles of international law to foreign govern-
mental acts taken within their own territory or, in other words, whether to limit
the scope of the act of state doctrine, the Supreme Court should apply the
following criteria. First, the application of international law in a particular case
or class of cases should not harm the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs.
If there is a legitimate danger in permitting adjudication, the Court should
decline to limit the scope of the act of state doctrine. On the other hand, given
the competing interests at stake, the Court should be able to perceive more than
a de minimis threat to the foreign policy branch before it decides that it will not
apply international law in a particular case or class of cases. 3
Second, the application of international law to a foreign government act
should promote the maintenance of a secure world economy. The interest in
promoting principles of international law mus,, if the situation demands it, be
weighed against potential harm to the conduct of foreign affairs.
Third, the act of state doctrine limitation in question should provide private
interests with the opportunity to have their claims adjudicated on their merits.
Private interests should not be deprived unnecessarily of their day in court.
H. The Trend Towards Limiting the Scope of
the Act of State Doctrine
The Supreme Court decision which initiated the recent debate concerning
the appropriate scope of the act of state doctrine was Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino. " Since Sabbatino was decided, the Court and Congress, in a
series of debisions, have gradually limited the scope of the act of state doctrine.
A. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino4
There has been considerable scholarly disagreement as to what, in fact,
4'The Court should give serious consideration to recommendations by the executive branch as
to the foreign policy implications of a particular adjudication. However, in its capacity as interpreter
of the Constitution, see note 19 supra, the Court should make the final determination as to whether
or not the foreign policy interests of the executive override its duty to hear a case before it on its
merits. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 467-71 (Justice White dissenting).
.376 U.S. 398 (1963); see Mann, The Legal Consequences of Sabbatino, 51 VA. L. REv. 604
(1965); R. FALK, op. cit., 403.
4'A great deal has, of course, already been written about the Sabbatino decision. In addition to
the citations in Note 44, supra, see generally, McDougal, Act of State in Policy Perspective, supra
note 12; Falk, The Sabbatino Controversy, THE AFTERMATH OF SABBATINO. THE HAMMARSKJOLD
FORUMS, Working Papers 525/65/1 (1965); Domke, Friedman and Henkin, Act of State: Sab-
batino in the Courts and in Congress, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 99 (1965); Friedmann, National
Courts and the International Legal Order, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1966); Stevenson, The
Sabbatino Case-Three Steps Forward and Two Steps Back, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 97 (1963); and
Snyder, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: The Supreme Court Speaks, 16 SYRAcusE L. REV.
15 (1964).
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Sabbatino held. 6 Justice Harlan's consideration of the act of state doctrine
began with an affirmation of dicta from prior act of state decisions which sug-
gested that the Court might refuse to consider the validity, under international
law, of any foreign governmental act taken within its own territory.4 7 The
opinion then suggested that there were several exceptions to this general rule
which would allow judicial consideration, such as the existence of "codification
or consensus" regarding controlling legal principles.48 The narrow holding of
Sabbatino was that, "in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agree-
ment regarding controlling legal principles," federal courts would not examine
takings of property within their own territory by foreign governments.49
1. APPLICATION OF PREFERRED
CRITERIA TO SABBATINO
First, being prevented from applying international law to expropriatory
actions, United States courts could not interfere with the executive's conduct
of foreign affairs. 0 The question that remains is whether or not such adjudica-
tions would, in fact, have more than a de minimis impact in the foreign relations
sphere. At the time Sabbatino was decided, the Department of State refused to
comment on whether it considered the adjudication of claims arising out of
nationalizations to be appropriate."s At the time of decision, the Court may
have had some justification for presuming that the conduct of foreign affairs
might be impeded.5 s Nevertheless, following the Sabbatino decision, several
commentators asked why adjudications regarding expropriations should be
"The literature reflects a wide range of opinions as to what Sabbatino held. For example, Profes-
sor Goldie concluded that the Court "seems to have come precariously close to legislating a doctrine
of full faith and credit for foreign judgments and decrees," Goldie, The Sabbatino Case: Interna-
tional Law Versus the Act of State, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 107, 137-38, 158 (1964). On the other
hand, Professor Mann observed:
Although it may surprise some readers and although prevailing impressions are likely to tend in
the opposite direction, the Supreme Court of the United States seems to have accepted in Sab-
batino the suggestion that a foreign act of state ceases to be sacrosanct when it is contrary to
international law.
Mann, op. cit., 604-12.
4 Sabbatino affirmed the broad dictum of Underhill v. Herandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of another taken within its own
territory. 376 U.S. at 416.
The majority opinion observed that "none of this Court's subsequent cases in which the act of state
doctrine was directly or peripherally involved manifested any retreat from Underhill." Id.
"1376 U.S. at 427-28.
"Ibid., p. 428.
50The Court explicitly stated that its holding was based on its desire not to intrude in the conduct
of foreign relations. 376 U.S. at 427-33. See Mann, op. cit., 623.
"1376 U.S. at 420.
"That is, if executive silence could be considered a recommendation not to adjudicate.
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singled out as potentially harming foreign relations while customary interna-
tional law might be applied to other government acts."
The Sabbatino holding did not promote the maintenance of a secure world
economy, nor did it promote the interests of the United States. In Sabbatino,
the Court was asked to rule that expropriation without compensation violated
international law. While there may have been some legitimate diversity as to the
amount of compensation which must be afforded in the event of an expropria-
tion,5" the Court ignored the overwhelming weight of precedent and authority
when it asserted that there was no consensus to support a holding that ex-
propriation without compensation violated international law."5 The movement
of capital and technology in the modern world is dependent upon the adherence
to rules which govern the flow of investment and, in particular, the rule that
compensation must be paid in the taking of alien-owned property.5 6 The in-
hibition of the movement of capital would adversely affect both the developed
and the developing countries.5 7 The United States clearly shares an interest in
promoting the secure flow of capital and technology, and the executive branch
has consistently adhered to the policy of supporting the duty to compensate. 11 In
Sabbatino, the Court failed to promote the maintenance of a secure world
economy and the interests of this country." 9
Finally, the Sabbatino holding denied to private interests the ability to have
their claims vindicated in court. There is evidence to suggest that the ability
to pursue claims for illegally expropriated property in court may benefit private
interests both in obtaining compensation and in inhibiting illegal expropria-
tions. 60 But the Sabbatino holding deprived private interests of the ability to
invoke that remedy and thus failed to meet the third preferred criterion for
evaluating act of state limitations.
The Sabbatino Court weighed the competing interests at stake and decided
in favor of deference to the executive. The Court was apparently reluctant to
tread on unsettled ground without some indication from the political branches
that its decision would not be viewed as an intrusion into the realm of the
"See, e.g., Mann, op. cit., 620-21; McDougal, loc. cit., note 12 supra.
"See, e.g., Weigel and Weston, op. cit., 3; McDougal, op cit., 352-53.
"Even the Sabbatino majority's most ardent supporter, Professor Falk, now appears to have
conceded that perhaps the Court should have distinguished between diversity as to relevant stan-
dards of compensation to be provided and the requirement of paying compensation. R. FALK, THE
STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 414-15.
"See, e.g.. Committee Report, The Compensation Requirement in the Taking of Alien Property,
22 N.Y. BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD, 196 (including footnotes); Weigel and Weston, op. cit. at 4;
McDougal, op. cit., 351-2.
"See, e.g., Committee Report, loc. cit. note 56, supra.
"Mann, op. cit., 620, 625-26.
"Ibid., 626-27.
"
0See Statement by the Department of State on Policy on "Hot" Libyan Oil, May 7, 1974, p. 3,
18.
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conduct of foreign relations. As discussed below, the presumption that the
executive might be impeded by adjudication of expropriation claims should now
be reversed.
B. The Sabbatino Amendment
In 1964, shortly after the Supreme Court's Sabbatino decision, Congress
(under its foreign affairs power6 ) acted to limit the scope of the act of state
doctrine by adopting the Sabbatino (or Second Hickenlooper) Amendment.6"
The Sabbatino Amendment provided that no court in the United States could
refuse, on the ground of the act of state doctrine, to consider on its merits the
legality, under the principles of international law, of a claim involving a con-
fiscation of property by the government of another nation. 63 The amendment
also provided that the president could require a court to apply the act of state
doctrine in a particular case by filing a "suggestion" to that effect with the
Court. 64 It also provided, by reference, the appropriate rule which courts should
apply in determining the legality of a confiscation of property.6
The purpose of the Sabbatino Amendment was to overrule the narrow hold-
ing in Sabbatino to the effect that federal courts could not examine expro-
priatory actions on their merits. 66 The original Sabbatino litigation, on remand
to the district court at the time the Sabbatino Amendment was enacted, 67 was
eventually decided on the basis of the Sabbatino Amendment.68 Cuba's ex-
6
'See McDougal, op. cit., 345-47; Recent Developments, Sabbatino Doctrine Modified in Foreign
Assistance Act ofl964, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1310, 1311-12 (1965); but see Cardozo, Congress Versus
Sabbatino: Constitutional Considerations, 4 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 297 (1966).
6 The Sabbatino Amendment was originally adopted as a rider to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1964. 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1969). After slight modification it was made permanent legislation in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 653, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (Supp. 1, 1965). Much has
been written about the Sabbatino Amendment. See generally, McDougal, op. cit., 343-50; Bleicher,
The Sabbatino Amendment in Court: Bitter Fruit, 20 STANFORD L.J. 858 (1968); Cardozo, op. cit.,
297ff.; Note, Act of State Doctrine: Effect of Sabbatino Amendment, 8 HARV. J. INT'L LAw 357
(1967); Statement by the Department of State on "Hot" Libyan Oil, May 7, 1974.
6322 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (Supp. 1, 1965); see Bleicher, loc. cit.
"'Loc. cit.
"
5Loc. cit. This results from the inclusion of a clause in the amendment to the effect that the
principles of international law to be applied include the principles set out in the rest of the sub-
section, which includes the first Hickenlooper Amendment. The first Hickenlooper Amendment
provided that the international law related to confiscations included "speedy compensation for such
property in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value thereof, as required by
international law." 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1964). Whether or not courts are required, as a result of
the "includes" clause, to apply the standards set forth in the Hickenlooper Amendment is not yet
fully resolved. See Bleicher, op. cit., at 860-69.
"'The Senate Report on the amendment spoke of achieving a "reversal of presumptions." That is,
that courts would assume that adjudications would not impede the conduct of foreign relations and
would apply international law, unless the Executive specifically advised against it. S. REP. No.
1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 24 (1964).
"Sub. nom. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 293 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) and Sup-
plemental Opinion, 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
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propriation was held to have violated international law and was therefore in-
effective to transfer title to property. 69 The Supreme Court denied certiorari
and thereby affirmed the application of the Sabbatino Amendment. 0
1. EVALUATING THE SABBATINO AMENDMENT
First, by providing that the president may require the application of the act of
state doctrine in particular cases, the Sabbatino Amendment' permits the
executive to maintain its control over the conduct of foreign relations. 7 Second,
the amendment promotes principles of international law which contribute to the
maintenance of a secure world economy and foster the national interest.7"
Finally, the Sabbatino Amendment provides private interests with the op-
portunity to vindicate their claims in Court.73 The Sabbatino Amendment
therefore meets all three preferred criteria for evaluating limitations on the
scope of the act of state doctrine.
C. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba
4
In 1972 the Supreme Court again considered the appropriate scope of the act
of state doctrine, in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba. " In
6383 F.2d at 183, affg, 243 F. Supp. at 980.
I°Cf. FALK, op. cit., 424-25.
"See McDougal, op. cit., 344. While this provision meets with the first preferred criterion for
evaluating act of state limitations it is still a second-best solution. As discussed supra TAN 19, the
judiciary, not the executive or Congress, should ultimately decide whether or not adjudication will
interfere with the conduct of foreign relations.
"See TAN 54-59 supra. The amendment promotes the principle that states owe a duty to com-
pensate in expropriations.
"The caveat which must be entered here is that by granting the executive the authority to require
courts to apply the act of state doctrine, the amendment allows the executive to determine when
private interests must be subordinated to the public welfare. The courts should determine whether
or not the executive suggestion should be followed. Cf. TAN 38-39; see, R. FALK, op. cit. 424.
11406 U.S. 759 (1972). See generally, Leigh, The Supreme Court and the Sabbatino Watchers:
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 33 (1972); Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 284-97 (1972); Case Comment, New Indications
of Justicability of American Claims Against Cuban Expropriation, 52 BOSTON U. L. REv. 847
(1972); Note, The Act of State Doctrine After First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
8 NEW ENG. L. REV. 219 (1973).
"First National City Bank foreclosed on a secured loan made to the Cuban government, sold
the collateral, and retained $1.8 million in excess collateral, which, it claimed, Cuba owed to it
as a result of Cuba's uncompensated expropriation of its property. Cuba sued to recover the col-
lateral. First National City counterclaimed for expropriation loss, and Cuba interposed the act of
state doctrine as a defense to the counterclaim. 406 U.S. at 760-61. The district court held that the
Sabbatino amendment barred Cuba's use of the act of state doctrine as a defense, Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); but the court of appeals
reversed on the grounds that the amendment was not broad enough to preclude the use of an act of
state defense, 431 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1970). After certiorari had been granted, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971)
the State Department legal adviser filed a letter with the Court which recommended that when the
executive filed a suggestion that the act of state doctrine need not be applied the Court should
proceed to examine the case on its merits; relying on the precedent of Bernstein v. N. V. Neder-
landsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The legal adviser stated that the act of state
doctrine should not be applied in cases involving counterclaims or set-offs "in this or like cases."
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this case the Court held that federal courts could examine the validity of foreign
governmental acts in cases in which the act of state doctrine is pleaded as a
defense against a counterclaim or set-off.76 While a majority of justices agreed
in the result, there was significant divergence of opinions. Three justices in the
plurality opinion held that in cases in which the executive specifically advises
a court that an adjudication would not interfere with the conduct of foreign
relations, courts should proceed to consider foreign governmental acts on their
merits. Thus, three justices approved the so-called Bernstein exception to the
act of state doctrine. " The four dissenting justices as well as the two justices
concurring in result emphatically rejected the Bernstein rationale. 8 It is not
likely that in future cases the validity of the Bernstein exception will be con-
firmed. 7 9 It is more appropriate to conclude only that the act of state doctrine
will not bar adjudication in cases involving counterclaims or set-offs. 80
1. EVALUATION OF FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK
There is very little basis to distinguish between the affront which might be
caused to a foreign government by a holding that its act violated international
406 U.S. at 764. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration
in light of the legal adviser's so-called Bernstein letter: but the court of appeals refused to reaffirm
the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine and again found in favor of Cuba. 442 F.2d 530
(2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court again granted certiorari, 404 U.S. 820 (1971).
'6406 U.S. at 764-68. See Leigh, op. cit., 34-35.
7'406 U.S. at 764-68. The opinion of Justice Rehnquist, in which Justices Burger and White
concurred, suggested that the application of the act of state doctrine is required almost exclusively
because of potential embarrassment to the executive. 406 U.S. at 767-68. Therefore, if the executive
expressly represents that an adjudication could not damage the interests of foreign policy, "'(t)he
reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases.'" 406 U.S. at 768. Judge Learned Hand had
followed a similar course in Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1954), in which the validity of certain Nazi decrees was in question. Justice Rehnquist's opinion
expressly affirmed Judge Hand's holding that a State Department letter removed the act of state
doctrine as a bar to adjudication. 406 U.S. at 768. See Leigh, op. cit., at 41-42.7 Justice Douglas, concurring in result, rejected the validity of the Bernstein exception, 406 U.S.
at 772. He allowed the set-off on the precedent of National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S.
356 (1965); a case in which it was ruled that a "sovereign's claim may be cut down by a counterclaim
or set-off." 406 U.S. 771-72. See Leigh, op. cit., at 40-43. Justice Powell, concurring in result,
rejected both the Bernstein exception and the precedent of Republic of China, 406 U.S. at 773-74;
but indicated that "[hlad I been a member of the Sabbatino Court, I probably would have joined the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White" 406 U.S. at 774. Justice Powell would consider the validity
of expropriations under customary international law. 406 U.S. at 774-75. See Leigh, op. cit., at
43-4.
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun. He emphatically
rejected the Bernstein exception, both because the Sabbatino holding was based on more than
deference to the executive branch, 406 U.S. at 785, and because he considered the Bernstein
exception to be an abdication of the judicial function to the executive. 406 U.S. at 790-93. Justice
Brennan's dissent strongly affirmed the Court's Sabbatino holding and indicated that in his view,
the validity of a foreign act of state in certain circumstances is "a 'political question' not cognizable
in our courts." 406 U.S. at 782-89. See Leigh, op. cit., at 44-5.
7 See Leigh, The Supreme Court and the Sabbatino Watchers, op cit., at 33, 45-6; but see
Gunther, op. cit., p. 293; and Note, 8 NEw ENG. L. REV. 225 (1973).
"
0See, Leigh, op. cit., at 34.
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law in a case involving a set-off or counterclaim as opposed to a case involving
expropriated property which has entered the federal jurisdiction." Both cases
involve the application of the same principles of international law to the same
act.8 2 Once again the question raised in Sabbatino must be considered: will
considering on the merits on expropriation by a foreign government impede the
conduct of foreign relations?
At the time First National City Bank was decided, the Court had before it
both the view of Congress expressed in the Sabbatino Amendment that the
Court should consider expropriations on their merits and the recommendation
of the Department of State's legal adviser that the conduct of foreign affairs
would not be impeded in cases involving counterclaims or set-offs. In light of
these expressions of opinion by the representatives of both political branches
of government, it was appropriate for the Court to conclude, on the weight of
the evidence before it, that considering the merits of an expropriation as it did
in First National City Bank would not jeopardize the conduct of foreign affairs.
First National City Bank's limitation of the scope of the act of state doctrine
also met the second criterion suggested for evaluating act of state claims. At
least in one class of cases, the Court chose to promote international law prin-
ciples which contribute to the maintenance of a secure world economy and
which further the national interest.
8 3
Finally, First National City Bank permitted private interests to have their
claims vindicated in court. While affirmation of the Bernstein exception would
certainly not contribute to judicial independence within the federal govern-
ment,8" the rejection of the exception by a clear majority of justices strongly
suggests that the Bernstein precedent will not be relied on by the Court in
future cases.
D. Trend Analysis
Since Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino was decided in 1963, the trend
in the Supreme Court, Congress, and the executive branch has been towards
limiting the scope of the act of state doctrine. Congress acted by passing the
Sabbatino Amendment, the executive by filing a suggestion to the Court urging
limitation, and the Court itself with its decision in First National City Bank.
This trend would appear to reflect a perception on the part of officials in the
three branches of government that adjudications regarding the legality of
"Perhaps, as Justice Douglas suggested, the affront might be lessened because "Cuba is the one
who asks our judicial aid in collecting its debt." 406 U.S. at 772.
2Both in Sabbatino and in First National City Bank the Court was asked to find that Cuba's
expropriation violated international law.
"
3See TAN 54-9 supra.
'406 U.S. at 792-93 (Justice Brennan dissenting).
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foreign governmental acts under international law are not likely to harm the
executive in the conduct of foreign affairs. It may also signal a recognition that
the Court has a duty to promote the interests of this nation in maintaining a
secure world economy; and an obligation to provide private interests with the
opportunity to achieve redress in the courts.
The Supreme Court was given an opportunity to continue this trend in Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba. 8 Pursuant to a request of the Court,
the litigants presented arguments on whether the Court's Sabbatino holding
should be reconsidered and the solicitor general and the Department of State
legal adviser both recommended further limitation of the act of state doctrine.
III. Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba
A. The Issue in Dunhil86
in 1960, the government of Cub confiscated the property and assets of five
cigar companies located in Cuba and owned by Cuban nationals. 7 Prior to
confiscation, these cigar companies had exported cigars to importers in the
United States (including Alfred Dunhill of London). At the time of confiscation,
the importers owed payments on accounts receivable, 88 which payments were
transmitted to the Cuban government. 89 The former owners of the cigar com-
panies, who had fled to the United States, sued in federal district court to
recover these payments from the importers 90 who asserted that their obligation
had been discharged by the prior payment to Cuba.9 1 The importers then sought
to recover the payments from Cuba on the ground that Cuba had been unjustly
enriched. 92 Cuba denied its liability both because the confiscation decree was
effective to transfer ownership to the receivables, 93 and because a governmental
refusal to return the payments would constitute an act of state which would bar
the court from rendering a judgment against it. 94
The district court held that the former cigar company owners retained owner-
ship of the accounts receivable, finding that the Cuban government's confisca-
tion decree violated the public policy of the United States and as such was in-
"
3Menendez v. Saks and Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom., Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974) (No. 73-1288), restored to calendar for
reargument with additional question, 422 U.S. 1005 (1975).
"The present article was written before the Supreme Court rendered its decision on May 24,
1976.
"
7 Menendez v. Faber, Coe, and Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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effective to transfer ownership of property located in this country9" at the time
the decree was issued. 96 The importers were not discharged from their obliga-
tion to pay the former owners by reason of previously having paid the Cuban
government,97 but Cuba was held liable to return the payments made on the
accounts to the importers. 9 Cuba's contention that its refusal to return these
payments would constitute an act of state, barring the court from rendering a
judgment against it, was rejected. 99 The importers were also allowed to set off
their unjust enrichment claims against Cuba against monies owed to it for post-
confiscation shipments of cigars. 100 Among the group of importers, only Dunhill
was awarded an affirmative judgment below against the Cuban goveirnment.' 1'
The court of appeals, 102 partially reversing, held Cuba's refusal to return the
importers' previous payments to constitute an act of state, as defined in Sab-
batino, and as such immune from judicial examination.103 However, the court
of appeals also held that the importers could set off the amounts previously paid
for preconfiscation shipments against amounts owed for postconfiscation ship-
ments. 10 4 Dunhill's affirmative judgment against Cuba was vacated and its
obligation to pay the former owners remained.105 Dunhill petitioned the Court
for review and certiorari was granted.
The Supreme Court was therefore presented with the question of whether
federal courts must give legal effect to a foreign governmerft's repudiation of
"
0 The situs of the debt is located with the debtor. 345 F. Supp. at 538, affd, 485 F.2d 1365.
9345 F. Supp. at 537-39. The district court relied on Republic of Iraq v. First National City
Bank, 253 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966) (effect given to acts of state
affecting property located in United States at time acts taken "only if they are consistent with the
policy and laws of the United States"). The district court previously had held in Palacio v. Brush,
256 F. Supp. 481, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Brush v.
Republic of Cuba, 389 U.S. 830 (1967), that the Cuban decree which confiscated the property of its
own nationals was contrary to United States policy and laws.
11345 F. Supp. at 540-42.
"
8 lbid., at 542-46.
"Ibid., at 544-46. Judge Bryan, in the district court, held that Cuba's obligation to return the
unjust enrichment arose in New York and thus could not be affected by an act of the Cuban govern-
ment. 345 F. Supp. at 545. His view was that, as Cuba's refusal was merely a statement of counsel
and not a formal governmental act, it could not be considered an act of state.
°Ibid., at 546.
"'Ibid., at 563-63. Cuba was ordered to return approximately $55,000 to Dunhill. This was the
amount by which payments on accounts exceeded the amount owed for postconfiscation shipments.
"'Menendez v. Saks and Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
"0'485 F.2d at 1370-71. Judge Mansfield, writing for the court of appeals, ruled that the Supreme
Court's rationale that the executive's conduct of foreign affairs might be impeded by an adjudica-
tion related to a foreign governmental act would as well apply to judicial enforcement of an implied
obligation as to a confiscation of property. Ibid., at 1370. The court of appeals also decided that an
act of state need not be embodied in a formal decree.
"'The court of appeals based its holding on First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S.759 (1972) (act of state doctrine need not act as bar to adjudication in cases invoking set
offs or counterclaims). Ibid., at 1372-74.
1°'Menendez v. Saks and Co., Ibid., at 1355, 1368.
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a commercial obligation, or more generally, whether federal courts can apply
international law to a foreign government's commercial acts.
C. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
The executive branch, in a brief filed by the solicitor general, recommended
that the Court limit the scope of the act of state doctrine to acts performed by
foreign governments in their public capacity ("qua sovereign").'0 6 Acts of
foreign governments in a commercial capacity, the solicitor general submitted,
should not be considered acts of state which federal courts must decline to
examine under international law.10 7
The solicitor general based this distinction on analogy to that created by the
"restrictive theory of sovereign immunity" to which the executive branch has
adhered since 1952 (the "Tate Letter"). 08 The restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity is applied only when foreign governments seek immunity from suit
in United States courts. The Department of State, whose suggestion regarding
whether or not sovereign immunity should be granted is generally given
deference in court, 0 9 considered whether the foreign government was acting
in a public (jure imperii) or commercial (ure gestionis) capacity. If the govern-
ment acts in a commercial capacity, sovereign immunity is not granted. 0
The distinction has been recognized in this and other countries as a result
of the increased participation by government-owned enterprises in international
commerce, " In the absence of this distinction, private interests are in a severely
disadvantaged position relative to state-owned enterprises because they may be
legally compelled to meet their obligations while state-owned enterprises are
not. The purpose of the restrictive theory, of sovereign immunity is to place
private and government-owned commercial enterprises on an equal footing." 2
The United States government argued that the distinction should be applied
to limit the scope of the act of state doctrine. The solicitor general expressly
advised the Court that examining the commercial acts of foreign states on their
merits would not interfere with the conduct of foreign relations. If foreign
1'0 Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 13-15, 27-31, 41-42, Alfred Dunhill of London v.





'Ibid., at 17-31. The solicitor general also somewhat misleadingly bases the public-commercial
distinction on a footnote in Justice White's dissenting opinion in Sabbatino, which cites a com-
mentator to the effect that "(a)n act of state has been said to be any governmental act in which the
sovereign's interest qua sovereign is involved." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
445 n.3, citing Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 LAw Q. REV. 42 (1943);
Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 27-28.
0See Moore, The Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings, 31 FoRnDAM L. REV.
277, 285-92 (1962).
"Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 20-23, supra note 105.
'Ibid., at 23-24.
"'Ibid., at 23-24, 26-27.
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governments could claim that their commercial acts were acts of state which
could not be examined by federal courts then, in effect, they could obtain
immunity from suit "through the back door." It would be impossible for private
interests to obtain judgment against government commercial interests because
all acts undertaken by the government would be considered valid. Once again,
private commercial interests would be placed in a disadvantaged position;
and the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity would be circumvented. 13
D. The Position of the Department of State
In a letter to the solicitor general (which is appended to the United States
brief in Dunhill) the legal adviser of the Department of State also advised the
Court that adjudications of the commercial liability of foreign states would not
impede the conduct of foreign relations."" The legal adviser, in addition, ad-
dressed the question posed by the Court: whether its Sabbatino holding should
be reconsidered.III He observed that the trend in this and other countries has
been towards limiting the scope of the act of state doctrine, and that in countries
where international law has been applied to foreign governmental acts, no
"serious foreign relations consequences" have resulted. He concluded that, if
the Court were to decide to overrule Sabbatino and to apply international law
to foreign governmental acts, the Department of State "would not anticipate
embarrassment to the conduct of the foreign policy of the United States." 1 6
IV. The Outcome in Dunhill
There are two alternative courses which the Supreme Court might have taken
in deciding to limit the scope of the act of state doctrine in Dunhill. First, by
limiting its decision to the specific issue in Dunhill, whether or not commercial
acts are acts of state, the Court could have adopted the distinction recom-
mended by the solicitor general. Second, if the Court chose to reconsider its
Sabbatino holding, it could have held that all foreign governmental acts must
be compatible with international law if they are to be given legal effect in federal
courts. A Supreme Court decision which adopted the distinction recommended
by the solicitor general would come very close to constituting an overruling of
Sabbatino, but reconsideration of Sabbatino is not essential for a decision in
Dunhill on the question of whether commercial acts are acts of state. This article
"'Ibid., 39-43, passim.
"'Ibid., at 46. The solicitor general's brief does not discuss the question of whether Sabbatino
should be reconsidered, but takes the position that since commercial acts fall outside the scope of
the act of state doctrine, it is unnecessary to consider the doctrine in its other realms of application
in order to reach a decision in Dunhill. Ibid., at 43.
'Ibid., at 47-48.
"'Ibid., at 48-49.
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contends that whichever of the alternative courses may be chosen by the Court,
it would have effectively overruled the broad dictum in Sabbatino. "
A. Applying Preferred Criteria to the Position Recommended by
the Solicitor General-Implications of its Adoption
On the basis of the submissions before it, it would have been appropriate
for the Court to draw the conclusion that examining the commercial acts of a
foreign government under international law would not impede the executive
in the conduct of foreign affairs. If state-owned enterprises were permitted to
escape commercial liability in federal courts by invoking the act of state doc-
trine, such enterprises would operate under blanket immunity from legal
obligation. The national interest is clearly not served by such a result.' 18
In addition, a holding that commercial acts are not acts of state would
promote international economic order. Governments, as well as private in-
terests, would continue to be expected to adhere to long-established rules of
behavior in their commercial dealings. ' Governments would be restrained
from arbitrarily exercising their authority against private commercial interests,
as well as against the commercial interests of other governments. This is clearly
a situation in which the common interests of all nations would be served by a
Supreme Court decision to apply international law. 1 0
Finally, and most significantly, by holding that commercial acts are not acts
of state, the Supreme Court would be permitting private interests the oppor-
tunity to have their claims vindicated in court. This is of special concern in the
commercial sphere because of the great participation of foreign governments
in international commerce.12 The Supreme Court would not only be maintain-
ing its own role within the federal government, but would be supporting an
executive determination that the public welfare is not served by immunizing
government commercial acts.
Thus, all three preferred criteria for evaluating whether to limit the scope of
the act of state doctrine are met in Dunhill.
The Sabbatino Amendment limited the scope of the act of state doctrine to
acts other than expropriations of property. "2 First National City Bank permit-
"'See TAN 47-48, supra.
"'Ibid., at 42-43.
"'The law applicable to international commercial dealings is well established, as is the rule that
sovereignty does not confer "a protected status" in commercial intercourse. Id. at 36-39. See also,
ALl, RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (SECOND), § 69, pp. 209-18 (1965); Mann, State
Contracts and State Responsibility, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 572 (1960).
'See Comment, Judicial Adoption of Restrictive Immunity for Foreign Sovereigns, 51 VA. L.
REV. 316, 321-24.
"'Brief of the United States as amicus curiae at 23-24, 42.
'
22See TAN 64 supra.
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ted the adjudication of counterclaims and set-offs. 23 If commercial acts are
likewise excluded from the protection of the act of state doctrine, then the only
situations in which the doctrine would presumably r main in effect are: first,
situations in which the executive recommends that the doctrine be applied in
expropriation cases (per the Sabbatino Amendment) and second, cases in which
federal courts would find it necessary to render affirmative judgments against
acts taken in a public capacity (other than expropriations).
Since executive suggestions relating to the foreign affairs power have tradi-
tionally carried great weight in United States courts,1"" the first exception
represents only a slight increment in the executive's authority to advise courts
that foreign relations would be adversely affected by an adjudication."'2 While
the legality of the public acts of foreign governments has been the subject of a
small amount of litigation in federal court,126 the relative lack of litigation in
this area suggests that this exception is not of great significance to the main-
tenance of international economic security or the national interest.
B. Sabbatino Overruled-The Application
Of Preferred Criteria
A holding which overruled Sabbatino would permit federal courts to consider
the legality of foreign governmental acts under relevant principles of inter-
national law. Such a holding, of course, satisfies the three preferred criteria
suggested for evaluating limitations on the scope of the act of state doctrine.
From what has been seen above, the overruling of Sabbatino would have, at
most, a de minimis impact on the executive branch.
Second, international law is in great part the expectations of national officials
"
3See TAN 77 supra.
s 
4See Moore, The Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings, 31 FORDHAM L. REV.
277 (1962); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 467-70 (Justice White dissenting).
"'The difference between an affirmation of the Bernstein exception and what might be
considered a "reverse Bernstein exception" in the Sabbatino Amendment is crucial. Under the
Bernstein exception, courts would not adjudicate foreign government acts unless specifically advised
to do so by the executive. The presumption strongly favors non-adjudication. Under the Sabbatino
Amendment, courts proceed to adjudicate unless specificallyadvised iot to do so. There is a strong
presumption in favor of adjudication. Nonetheless, it would be preferable to let the courts ultimately
decide whether or not to accept the executive's recommendation. See TAN 19 and note 71 supra.
1'The challenging of the validity of public governmental acts under international law has oc-
curred in the antitrust field. See, Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil Co., 331 F.
Supp. 92 (C.D. Calif. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
In this case Occidental alleged that Buttes Gas had conspired with the rulers of certain Persian Gulf
States (and Great Britain) to deprive it of valuable oil concessions by changing boundaries in ter-
ritorial seas. The allegations included that the acts of the gbvernment co-conspirators violated
international law. The district court ruled, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the act of state
doctrine (per Sabbatino) prevented the court from inquiring into the legality of the foreign govern-
ments' acts and dismissed the complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted." 331 F. Supp. at 108-13. See INTERNATIONAL LAW Assoc., FIFTY-FIFTH REPORT 149-51
(1972).
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about the way in which authority will be exercised by officials in other states. 27
The application of international law by federal courts to foreign governmental
acts will promote the expectation that authority must be exercised consistently
with such law. Security in the international economy is promoted by the main-
tenance of such expectations."18
Finally, the Constitution allocates to the judicial branch the obligation to
adjudicate controversies on their merits, including those in which foreign states
are participants and in which international law must be applied.' 2 9 As Justice
White noted in his Sabbatino dissent, "[flundamental fairness to litigants" may
require the application of international law in a case or controversy. 3 °
Whatever the scope of its decision, whether to limit the act of state doctrine
to public acts, or to overrule Sabbatino, a refusal by the Supreme Court to give
legal effect to Cuba's repudiation of its commercial obligation on act of state
grounds would be warranted. This would then clear the way for a consideration
of Cuba's action under the relevant principles of international law. There is
ample precedent and authority to support a holding that international law
requires states to make restitution for an unjust enrichment. 3 '
Epilogue
The Supreme Court decided Dunhill on May 24, 1976. The Court held that
Cuba's apparent repudiation of its obligation to Dunhill was not an act of state
and that, in consequence, the district court did not err in ordering Cuba to
return Dunhill's mistaken payment. Justice White's opinion for a 5-4 majority
of the Court contained two independent grounds on which Cuba's act of state
claim was rejected. The first was that counsel for Cuba offered no evidence
other than its own litigating position to show that any sovereign authority in
Cuba had in fact decided to repudiate its obligation to Dunhill. Thus, no act
of state was proven. Justice White, in addition, adopted the position recom-
mended by the solicitor general to the effect that the commercial acts of foreign
states are to be distinguished from public acts and that the former are not acts
of state which United States courts must refuse to examine. The Court did not
reach the question of whether Sabbatino should be reconsidered.
'See (TAN 22-29 supra.
"'McDougal, op. cit., 351-352.
"'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 450-53 (Justice White dissenting).
130376 U.S. at 453.
...See, e.g., Schreuer, Unjustified Enrichment in International Law, 22 AM. J. CoMp. L. 281
(1974) and cases ited therein; see also, Landreau Claim (United States/Peru), 1 U.N. REP. INT'L
ARB. AWARDS 347, 364 (1921) (recovery on a quantum meruit basis); Parker Claim (United States/
Mexico), 4 U.N. REP. INT'L AMR. AWARDS 35, 40 (1927) (liability based on "a tacit or implied
contract"); The Lena Goldfields case (U.S.S.R. v. United Kingdom) (1930), III WHITEMAN,
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1737-40 (award based on restitution of an "unjust enrichment"
arising out of U.S.S.R.'s breach of contract).
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JusticeStevens concurred in rejecting Cuba's act of state claim but only to the
extent that counsel had offered no evidence to show that a sovereign Cuban
authority had, in fact, repudiated its obligation.
Justice Marshall, in dissent, would have denied the rendering of an affir-
mative judgment against Cuba on a variety of grounds. First, the statements
made by counsel for Cuba regarding its intention to repudiate its alleged obliga-
tion would be accepted as confirming an exercise of sovereign authority.
Second, the dissenting justices refused to accept the public-commercial dis-
tinction recommended by the solicitor general inasmuch as the policies under-
lying the granting of sovereign immunity and the application of the act of state
doctrine are seen to be different. Third, Cuba's retention of Dunhill's funds
would have been considered a part of the same act by which the property of its
own nationals was confiscated. Finally, but not exhaustively, Justice Marshall
considered that the rendering of an affirmative judgment against Cuba was not
mandated by the Court's First National City Bank decision. Professor Falk's
tenuous rationale once again figured heavily in the dissent's approval of Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.
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